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1. Introduction 
The analysis of wage inequality and its determinants has received much attention in economic 
literature (Blau and Kahn, 1999 and Katz and Autor, 1999). However, in contrast with the 
abundance of international literature that has documented wage dispersion and its trends in other 
countries over the last few decades, research addressing these issues in Spain is not extensive. Two 
exceptions which can be highlighted are Jimeno et al. (2001) and Palacio and Simón (2004) who 
identify education, the type of contract and the profession of individuals and the different wage 
levels between companies as factors that have a significant impact on inequality levels in the 
Spanish labour market. From a time perspective, Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2006) sustain that in 
recent years wage inequality in Spain has been decreasing as a result of the opposing effects 
derived from changes in the composition of the workforce, which have had an increasing effect on 
inequality, and from modifications experienced by certain returns, which have tended to reduce 
inequality. Evidence obtained by Simón (2009) suggests that, from an international perspective, 
there are a series of significant unique features inherent in the Spanish wage structure, including 
the way in which the characteristics of the economic agents are remunerated in the Spanish labour 
market that generates, in relative terms, a significant reduction in wage inequality.  
The aim of this study is to analyse wage inequality and its trends in Spain from a regional 
point of view. The study from this perspective is justified as wage determination in Spain 
incorporates an important territorial component, facilitated by certain specific institutional 
elements. As it is well known, the Spanish collective bargaining system is characterised by a very 
high coverage rate and by the presence of two levels of wage negotiation, the industry and 
company levels, the latter having a lower quantitative importance (see, for example, Banco de 
España, 2009). This system, characterised by a high coverage rate and by the predominance of 
industry-level agreements, is relatively common in other eurozone countries, which also possess 
bargaining systems with an intermediate level of centralisation (Du Caju et al., 2008). However, in 
contrast to these other countries, the majority of workers in Spain covered by collective bargaining 
are covered by industry-wide agreements which have a regional rather than national scope. No 
other country close to Spain (except for Germany) has a predominantly sectoral bargaining system 
which is developed fundamentally through industry-wide agreements with an infra-national scope.  
Furthermore, the link that exists in practice between the minimum wages agreed in the 
industry-wide agreements and the actual wages received by the workers is highly significant (see, 
for example, Dolado et al. 1997). The unusual regional dimension of sectoral collective bargaining 
that exists in Spain plausibly facilitates the presence of differentiated regional mechanisms of wage 
determination. This circumstance is consistent with international evidence, in the sense that 
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collective wage bargaining is a labour institution that is highly influential in shaping the wage 
differences between regions that exist in each country (Vamvakidis, 2008), a fact that can be clearly 
seen in the specific labour market of Spain, where regional differences in real wages are very 
similar to those of the wage floors that are established by sectoral agreements on an infra-national 
scale (Simón et al, 2006). 
The wage differences between regions in Spain are, in practice, highly significant, and large 
in size when compared with other European countries (García and Molina, 2002 and Serrano, 
2002). Moreover, they are highly persistent over time, which is partially explained by the high 
degree of homogeneity between regions in terms of the wage increases established by industry-
wide collective agreements (Alonso and Izquierdo, 1999). This pronounced persistence over time 
is practically incompatible with a wage adjustment capacity that is sufficient to respond to changes 
in economic conditions. Consequently, in the Spanish labour market there is only a limited 
dynamic association between the regional wage differences and unemployment rates and regional 
levels of productivity (Bentolila and Jimeno, 1998 and Bentolila and Dolado, 1991). Furthermore, 
the differences in wage levels between regions are only partially caused by competitive factors such 
as regional differences in prices or the composition of the workforce (López-Bazo and Motellón, 
2009 and Simón et al., 2006). This circumstance, together with the low inter-territorial migratory 
flows and their low response to regional wage differences, are the main factors that explain the 
strongly defined regional segmentation of the Spanish labour market (Bentolila and Jimeno, 1998 
and Bover and Velilla, 2005), which is evident in distinct and highly persistent differences in both 
employment rates and, especially, unemployment rates (Bande et al., 2008).  
In contrast with previous studies on Spain which have exclusively analysed the presence of 
regional differences in wage levels, the objective of this study is to examine the regional differences 
in wage inequality. It is worth highlighting that very few references have been made to the regional 
dimension in the analysis of the distribution of wages other than average wages. These references 
are limited to Ahn et al, (2001), who identified the existence of significant regional differences in 
the degree of wage inequality and found that the relative size of the young population is a 
significant factor in explaining the phenomenon, and El-Attar and López-Bazo (2006), whose 
findings show that regional differences in both wage dispersion and wage distribution as a whole 
can be explained by a combination of regional differences in the endowments and relative returns 
of workforce and companies characteristics. The especial emphasis of this study on the analysis of 
the regional dimension of wage inequality will consequently contribute to improving general 
knowledge of this phenomenon and its determinants in Spain.   
One noteworthy aspect of the research refers to the use of Lorenz inference-based 
stochastic dominance techniques. This methodology, as opposed to more common comparative 
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analyses, based on specific wage inequality measures, enables the non-ambiguous ranking of wage 
distributions according to their degree of inequality. This avoids the classic multiplicity of index 
numbers problem whereby the significance of the results of distribution inequality comparisons 
may vary depending on the specific inequality indexes used (Bishop and Formby, 1994). In 
contrast, the use of the empirical comparison of Lorenz stochastic dominance provides a clear way 
of examining whether significant differences in inequality levels exist in practice between Spanish 
regions, and the extent to which inequality experiences significant changes over time. In addition, 
it is worth highlighting that there are very few studies in international literature that have applied 
this methodology to the analysis of wage distributions: as far as we know, the only exception is 
Bishop et al. (1997) for the case of the United States.  
This study attempts to provide answers to two basic questions. The first is to what extent 
there are significant differences between wage inequality levels in Spanish regions, and in the case 
where they exist, to identify their underlying factors. This analysis is related to previous studies 
carried out from an international comparative perspective addressing the reasons for the strong 
heterogeneity existing between countries in the level of wage inequality. The results of these 
studies suggest that the differences in workforce characteristics only explain a small proportion of 
international differences in inequality, indicating that the majority of these differences are 
associated with differences in the characteristics of job positions and companies (Blau and Kahn, 
1996 and 2005 and Simón, 2010). The analysis of the factors that influence the regional differences 
in inequality levels is developed by using both the inference-based Lorenz stochastic dominance 
techniques together with the methodology proposed by Juhn et al. (1993). This technique enables 
the generation of counterfactual wage distributions under certain hypothetical scenarios, and its 
application facilitates a specific examination of whether the regional differences in wage inequality 
are due to Spanish regions being different in terms of the composition of their workforces and 
firms or, alternatively, to the presence of differentiated mechanisms for determining wages. 
The second issue that is addressed is the extent to which all the Spanish regions share the 
same evolutionary trends of wage inequality than Spain as a whole. In this respect, it should be 
noted that although Spain exhibits an intermediate level of wage inequality compared with the 
other countries of the European Union (Simón, 2009 and 2010), more recently this inequality has 
started to diminish considerably. This circumstance contrasts with the general pattern of 
developed countries, where the most common trend has been an increase or maintenance of wage 
inequality, to the point where Spain is one of the very few developed countries in which wage 
inequality has decreased significantly in recent years (OCDE, 2007). Therefore, one of the specific 
points of interest of the study is to identify to what measure this trend in wage inequality observed 
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for the Spanish labour market as a whole is a phenomenon that extends to all the regions in 
general.   
In short, the main findings of the research reveal that in practice there are significant 
variations between regions in terms of the wage inequality in the Spanish labour market, and that 
the overall process of wage inequality reduction which is being experienced in Spain is a 
phenomenon that extends to the majority of the regions. They also suggest that the regional 
differences existing in the characteristics of the workforce and companies constitute a highly 
significant determinant of the regional differences in wage inequality, although the presence of 
different mechanisms for determining wages also plays a relevant role. 
The structure of the research is as follows. Following this introduction, the second section 
describes the data. Subsequently, the third section specifies the methodology used. The fourth 
section provides descriptive evidence and develops an empirical analysis of wage inequality in the 
Spanish regions. The study finishes with the conclusions. 
2. Data  
The information source from which the microdata have been retrieved for the research 
study is the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Wage Structure Survey; hereafter EES) for 1995 and 
2002. The EES is a two-stage survey of wage earners based on their employers’ social security 
contributions. One of the most relevant features of the EES is that it includes observations for 
individuals in each establishment, therefore providing what is known in economic literature as 
matched employer-employee microdata (reviews of the significant impact that the availability of 
this type of microdata has had on the understanding of how the labour market operates, and 
particularly with respect to wage determination, may be found in Hamermesh, 2008 and Abowd 
and Kramarz, 1999). The EES covers those employees that work in establishments with ten or 
more workers in the following branchs of activity: industry, construction, retail, hotel and 
restaurant trade, transport and communications, financial intermediation, property sale and rental 
activities and business services (and in the case of the 2002 wave, also health, education and other 
social activities). Although the EES possibly represents the most complete source of 
microeconomic data on wages in Spain, the fact that the its coverage of the labour market is not 
complete should be taken into account when interpreting the results of the empirical analysis. 
In addition to information regarding wages, the EES contains diverse information with 
respect to the characteristics of the workers (sex, age, education and seniority) and their job 
positions and companies (occupation, type of contract, working hours, sector, size, type of 
collective agreement and region). The information contained in the EES also facilitates the 
calculation of variables relative to the composition of the workforce based on the series of 
observations for each establishment. Although these types of variables are subject to a certain 
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degree of measurement error as they are calculated from information of a sample, it should be 
noted that their use in econometric analysis is relatively frequent (see, for example, Bayard et al., 
2003 and Card and De la Rica, 2006). Another point to take into consideration is that those 
observations corresponding to the over-65s and resident of Ceuta and Melilla have been 
eliminated, and, in the case of the 2002 wave of the EES, those observations relating to the sectors 
of activity that were not covered in the 1995 wave have also been eliminated in order to develop 
an empirical analysis for a homogeneous segment of the labour market. The final samples include 
a total of 155,889 observations for 1995 and 107,961 observations for 2002. The samples have a 
relatively large size and enable analyses to be developed broken down by region (the size of the 
regional samples in 1995 range from 3,238 observations for La Rioja to 22,640 for Madrid and in 
2002 from 2,199 observations for La Rioja to 17,961 for Catalonia). 
The wage concept used in the empirical analysis is the gross hourly wage. This wage has 
been calculated using the wage information corresponding to the month of October for each year, 
which was selected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spanish National Institute of Statistics) 
due to the fact that October is representative of the whole year in terms of wage payments. The 
wage per hour has the same definition for both 1995 and 2002, rendering it totally comparable 
between both periods, and it covers all types of payments made by companies, with the exception 
of overtime payments1. The wages of 1995, originally expressed in pesetas, have been converted 
into euros. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Lorenz stochastic dominance and statistical inference 
 Traditionally, stochastic dominance techniques have been principal tools in comparative 
empirical research studies on income and economic wellbeing (see, for example, the analyses 
developed using these techniques in Bishop et al., 1991 and Ahamdanech and García, 2007, from 
an international comparative perspective, and Del Río and Ruiz-Castillo, 1996, for the specific case 
of Spain). However, their application in the comparative analysis of wage distributions has had a 
significantly more limited scope, despite the advantages inherent in adapting the technique to this 
field of study.  
One of the most notable advantages of the Lorenz dominance for comparing relative wage 
inequality between regions (or, alternatively its evolution over time) is that this comparison is not 
based on specific measurements of wage distribution, but uses them all. There are also tools of 
statistical inference that can be used to avoid problems derived from sampling errors which arise 
                                                 
1
 The calculation of the hourly wage has been carried out for both 1995 and 2002 in the following way: [(basic 
monthly wage + monthly wage complements + extra annual payments calculated per month)]/[bargained annual 
working time/12]. 
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when working with samples. Not considering these errors appropriately can frequently lead, in 
practice, to erroneous conclusions in comparative analyses of the stochastic dominance between 
distributions (Bishop et al., 1997). 
 The Lorenz dominance applied to the context of this study is based on the comparison of 
the Lorenz curves of two wage distributions. Let AiL  be the coordinate of the Lorenz curve of 
wage distribution for region A in quantile i. According to the Lorenz method, wage distribution of 
region A dominates that of region B if Bi
A
i LL ≥  for every i with at least a strict inequality. Thus, if 
wage distribution of region A Lorenz dominates that of region B the distribution of A is more 
egalitarian than that of B2, taking into account that the whole distribution has been used for the 
comparison. In the case where the Lorenz curves of the two regions cross, there are no dominance 
relations in terms of inequality between their wage distributions3. It is important to point out that 
Lorenz dominance is not incompatible with the use of inequality indices, which provide complete 
rankings, rather it is complementary to them, enriching the examination of the phenomenon.  
Notwithstanding, if the empirical analyses are based on sample data, the cuts in the curves 
may be due to sampling errors, and consequently they will not be statistically significant. However, 
certain hypothesis testing procedures can be found in the economic literature with respect to this 
question that are useful in determining whether the cuts in the curves are significant, which 
extends the ranking power of the technique described. Although a detailed analysis of the 
application of stochastic inference for the Lorenz dominance is presented in Appendix 1, it is 
important to highlight some aspects. Firstly, it is based on samples from which sampling statistics 
are generated whose asymptotic distributions are obtained. A hypothesis test is developed based 
on these distributions in order to analyse the statistical significance of the differences in the 
Lorenz curve coordinates. The sampling weights of the observations included in the survey are 
considered in the calculations for obtaining the comparative statistics between coordinates of the 
Lorenz curve, whose expressions are presented in Appendix 1.  
3.2. The Juhn et al. (1993) technique 
As indicated in the introduction, one of the basic objectives of this study is to examine the 
factors that influence the regional differences in levels of wage inequality. In order to analyse this 
question in more detail, in addition to the inferential techniques of statistical dominance, the 
methodology proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) has been used. This technique is based on the 
calculation of counterfactual wage distributions (more details of its application may be found in 
                                                 
2 Atkinson (1970) includes a formal demonstration of how a Lorenz dominance of a distribution over another implies 
that the values of the indices usually used in economic literature for measuring inequality, such as the Gini index or the 
variation coefficient, are necessarily lower for the first distribution.   
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Appendix 1). Adapted to the specific context of this research study, this technique enables us to 
calculate the counterfactual wage distributions that each of the Spanish regions would have in the 
case where they differ from a reference wage distribution (that corresponding to Spain as a whole 
has been used), exclusively in the characteristics of the workers and companies or, alternatively, in 
the relative returns of these characteristics. Through the subsequent application of the stochastic 
dominance technique to the counterfactual wage distributions which are generated by this 
methodology, it is possible to analyse the reasons for the regional differences in wage inequality, 
and more specifically, whether these differences are due to the Spanish regions being different in 
terms of the composition of their workforce and companies, or alternatively in the way in which 
these factors are remunerated4.  
The explanatory variables included in the specification of the wage equations on which the 
technique proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) is based cover a wide spectrum of characteristics both in 
terms of the individuals and their job positions and companies5. The former comprise the gender 
of the individual; the maximum level of general education (distinguishing between eleven different 
levels); the years of potential experience in the labour market (measured as the age of the 
individual less the age when entering the labour market after finishing full time education) and its 
quadratic form and years of seniority in the current position and its quadratic form. The 
characteristics of the job positions considered are the type of contract (permanent or temporary); 
the type of working day (full time or part time) and occupation (distinguishing between fifty seven 
occupations)6. Finally, the attributes of the establishments are the sector (considering the divisions 
of the CNAE-93 classification); the type of collective agreement (industry-wide on a national level, 
industry-wide on a regional or provincial level, company agreement and other types of agreement); 
the size (five segments); the proportion of women; and the average number of years of education, 
seniority and experience, respectively of the establishment’s workforce7. 
                                                                                                                                                          
3
 Note that the comparison is applicable immediately to the comparison of inequality of a region in two moments of 
time. 
4 One of the shortcomings of this technique is that it does not provide detailed information regarding the individual 
effect of each of the explanatory variables included in the equation, only of the overall effect of them all. This 
circumstance implies that it is not possible to differentiate between variables in accordance with criteria such as their 
evaluation from the point of view of equal opportunities and social justice (see Roemer, 1998).    
5
 It is worth highlighting that the explanatory capacity of the wage equations is relatively high: the adjusted coefficients 
of determination of the regressions of equations (A.4) and (A.5) take values of around 0.55 for both years in the case 
of Spain and of between 0.44 and 0.66 for each of the Spanish regions. The detailed results of the estimates are not 
included in the study due to space constraints, but they are available from the authors on request.  
6 Although the 2002 wave of the EES incorporates information regarding the nationality of the individual, and 
whether the individual carries out a supervisory role, these variables are not included in the 1995 wave. Consequently, 
it was decided not to include them in the specification of the equation.   
7 While not being a exhaustive justification for using these explanatory variables, the majority of which constitute 
standards in economic literature, it should be pointed out that the inclusion of the proportion of women and the 
average years of education, seniority and experience in the establishment respond to the recent evidence available for 
Spain in the sense that a high presence of women significantly decreases relative wages of companies (Amuedo-
8
  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive evidence 
Table 1 contains, for the whole of the period analysed, information of the Spanish regions 
regarding average wages and wage inequality (the latter is measured through the use of two 
inequality indices usually employed, the Gini index and the Theil index). By examining this 
evidence it can be clearly observed that the presence in the Spanish labour market of differences 
between regions in terms of wage structures is not limited to average wages, but extends to the 
levels of wage inequality. The regional variability in the levels of inequality of hourly wages is a 
phenomenon which seems to become more accentuated over time (the coefficient of variation of 
the regional values of both measurements of inequality experience significant increases: from 0.092 
to 0.142 in the case of the Gini index and from 0.201 to 0.280 in the case of the Theil index). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting the strong temporal stability in regional wage determination, given 
the strong similarity in both years with respect to both regional differences in average wages (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.95) and those of inequality levels (the correlation coefficient of both 
measurements of inequality is higher than 0.75 and statistically significant at conventional levels). 
A final circumstance to highlight is the presence of a relationship, albeit more prominent in 2002, 
between the levels of average wages and wage inequality whereby both tend to be comparatively 
higher (lower) in the same regions. 
In the specific case of wage inequality, the region with the largest inequality is 
systematically that of Madrid (where, by way of example, the Theil index in 1995 and 2005 takes 
values of 0.231 and 0.230, significantly higher than the values of this index for Spain as a whole, 
0.184 and 0.167 respectively)8. On the contrary, the lowest levels of inequality are found in 
Navarra and La Rioja in 1995 (according to the Theil index and Gini values respectively), and in 
Cantabria (according to both indexes) in 2002. As it can be observed, while the regional rankings 
of inequality at each moment of time show a similar trend for both measurements of inequality 
(the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for regional values of both measurements takes values 
of 0.958 in 1995 and 0.970 in 2002), these rankings exhibit certain differences depending on the 
specific measurement of inequality. These results illustrate the problem of multiplicity of indices 
that frequently arises in comparative analyses when inequality measurements are used.  
                                                                                                                                                          
Dorantes and De la Rica, 2006), and that the endowment of the workforce as a whole of a company in practice has a 
high impact on the individual wages of all of the workers (Alcalá and Hernández, 2006).  
8 Elaborating on this point, it is worth highlighting that, according to the data of the European Wage Structure Survey, 
the wage inequality in Madrid in 2002 was only exceeded in the context of the EU-15 by the regions of London and 
Île de France when the NUTS1 territorial references are considered (Eurostat, 2005). Note that the European Wage 
Structure Survey contains equivalent information to that of the Wage Structure Survey conducted for Spain by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics and is wholly comparable between countries.  
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From a time perspective, it can also be confirmed that the significant reduction in wage 
inequality in the Spanish labour market in recent years seems to have a general nature, insofar as it 
extends to the majority of the Spanish regions. The only exceptions are Andalusia and Galicia 
where the values of the Theil index suggest that there could have been a rise in wage inequality. 
The regional orderings of inequality exhibit a significant stability over time (the Spearman Rank 
correlation coefficient has values of 0.730 and 0806 when the regional rankings of 1995 and 2002 
are compared using the Gini index and the Theil index respectively). However, changes in the 
regional rankings of inequality may be observed over time, which indicates that the specific size of 
the reduction in inequality in some cases can represent significant regional differences.  
Based on the above-mentioned descriptive evidence it can be established that the results of 
regional comparisons of inequality may be sensitive to the index used to measure it, and that the 
reduction in wage inequality in Spain, while having a general nature, exhibits a certain degree of 
regional heterogeneity in its intensity. These circumstances underline the advisability of using 
stochastic dominance techniques for analysing the relative levels of wage inequality in Spanish 
regions and their changes over time, given the advantages associated with their use. Therefore, in 
relation to the first point, these techniques provide an unambiguous ranking with respect to levels 
of inequality, enabling a record to be made of those cases in which regional differences of 
inequality are statistically significant. With regard to the second point, these techniques allow us to 
determine those specific Spanish regions that have experienced a significant reduction in wage 
inequality. 
4.2. Lorenz dominance 
The first question that this study attempts to address is the extent to which significant and 
persistent wage differences exist between the wage inequality levels of Spanish regions. In order to 
explain this question, tables 2 and 3 include the results derived from applying the contrasts of 
Lorenz stochastic dominance to the bilateral comparisons of wage distributions of the Spanish 
regions for each of the years analysed (the first column of each table corresponds to the 
comparison with the wage distribution for Spain as a whole). In order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the results, it is worth pointing out that if a region exercises Lorenz dominance in 
a positive (negative) sense over another, this implies that the first has a lower (higher) wage 
inequality. Furthermore, this dominance is strong if statistically significant differences of the same 
sign are detected in the coordinates of the two Lorenz curves in the comparisons developed for all 
the deciles of the distributions. The dominance is weak if there is some statistically significant 
difference in one of them, but there is at least one decile for which the null hypothesis of the 
equality of the coordinates of the two Lorenz curves cannot be rejected. Finally, there is no 
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dominance of one distribution over another if the results of the comparisons reveal differences 
with opposite signs in different deciles. 
Figures 1 and 2 contain the Hesse diagrams for the regional wage distributions (together 
with that of Spain as a whole) for 1995 and 2002 respectively. These diagrams represent a ranking 
of the distributions in accordance with their inequality, whereby those territories that occupy a 
higher position have a lower wage inequality. The presence of a continuous line between the boxes 
of two territories corresponds to a situation in which, according to the stochastic dominance 
comparisons, the territory with a higher position Lorenz dominates the other (either weak or 
strong dominance) and therefore, has a lower wage inequality. Furthermore, with a continuous line 
all of the dominances that are transmitted flowing down from the lines that intersect it are taken 
into account. A discontinuous line implies that there is dominance between the two territories that 
it connects, but intersection with other lines does not imply dominance. Finally, table 4 illustrates 
an indicator with which the position of each region in the Hesse diagram is determined, and which 
corresponds to the number of dominances of the region of reference over the rest of the regions 
less the number of dominances of the other regions over the region of reference. 
The Hesse diagrams reveal that, in practice, there are many Lorenz dominances between 
regions, a circumstance that confirms that the levels of wage inequality of Spanish regions are not 
similar and exhibit considerable differences. Likewise, irrespective of the year of reference, regions 
such as Catalonia, Galicia and Madrid reveal a trend of comparatively high inequality levels while, 
on the contrary, La Rioja or Navarra possess a comparatively low wage inequality. These results 
are consistent, in turn, with the values of the synthetic rank position indicators for each region in 
the diagrams (table 4). Focusing on the comparison with Spain as a whole, one result worth 
mentioning is that it can be concluded that Madrid is the only Spanish region that has levels of 
wage inequality that are higher than the national average, with the opposite scenario applying to 
the majority of the other regions. This finding suggests that the wage inequality existing in Spain as 
a whole is highly influenced by the specific case of Madrid, which can be plausibly explained, 
among other circumstances, by its high relative demographic weight. 
The detailed results of the stochastic dominance comparisons included in tables 2 and 3 
confirm that the differences in inequality existing between Spanish regions and the national 
average (first column of the tables) are evident in a high proportion of cases (including that of the 
comparison of Madrid with Spain) in the form of strong dominance of one distribution over 
another, being statistically significant at 1%. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the number of 
dominances in the comparisons between regions is much higher, especially in the case of strong 
dominances, in 2002 (for which 51 bilateral comparisons reveal weak dominances; 54 strong 
dominances with a level of significance of at least 10% and 21 comparisons no dominances) than 
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in 1995 (for which 59 of the 136 bilateral comparisons reveal weak dominances; 39 strong 
dominance and no dominances are found in 38 comparisons). This result confirms that the 
differences between regions in terms of wage inequality levels tend to become more intense over 
time.  
In some regions significant changes in relative levels of wage inequality are detected. 
Aragon, for example, in 1995 was among the regions with the lowest levels of inequality and in 
2002 it had become one of the regions with highest inequality. From having an intermediate level 
of inequality, Cantabria and Extremadura became regions with some of the lowest levels of 
inequality and the Canary Islands became a region with an intermediate level of inequality in 2002 
after having a comparatively high level in 1995. The rank position indicators of the regions in the 
Hesse diagrams for both years reveal however, a positive and statistically significant correlation 
(also taking into consideration Spain in the comparison, the Spearman Rank correlation coefficient 
takes a value of 0.76, being statistically significant at 1%), which suggests that on the whole there is 
relatively stable ranking of the Spanish regions in accordance with their levels of inequality.    
Overall, the findings reveal that there are significant and persistent wage differences 
between the wage inequality levels of Spanish regions, and that these differences tend to become 
more pronounced over time. The next step in the analysis is concerned with identifying the factors 
that underlie these differences and more specifically, the extent to which they are caused by inter-
regional differences in terms of the characteristics of the workers and companies or, alternatively 
by inter-regional differences in the relative returns of these factors. 
Tables A.1 to A.4 of Appendix 2 show the results of applying stochastic dominance 
techniques to the analysis of the Lorenz dominance between the regional wage distributions 
corresponding to the two types of counterfactual wages generated with the technique proposed by 
Juhn et al. (1993). These tables also include the results of the bilateral comparisons of the 
counterfactual distributions between all the regions and those of the comparison of each of them 
with that of Spain as a whole (note that the latter case is equivalent to the comparison with the 
wage distribution observed for Spain, given that this is the reference taken in the generation of 
counterfactual wages).  
The hypothetical wages 1, as referred to herein, have been obtained for each region from 
the equation (A.6), which implies the application of the returns of the characteristics and the effect 
of the unobservable factors of Spain on the characteristics of the individuals and companies in 
each region. The differences between regions in terms of the distributions of hypothetical wages 1 
therefore are exclusively due to their differences in characteristics, so the results of the 
comparisons in this case are indicative of the effect of this factor in the generation of regional 
differences in wage inequality. In relation to this point, the existence of a highly significant number 
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of dominances between counterfactual distributions is evident: the results for 1995 and 2002 give 
values of 115 and 108 respectively of the 136 possible bilateral comparisons between regions 
(although the number of strong dominances decreases considerably between the two years, from 
35 to 7: tables A.1 and A.3). Expanding on this point, the majority of the regions reveal 
characteristics that differ from those of Spain as a whole to the point where this difference on its 
own generates a wage inequality that is different from the national average (being higher in seven 
and ten cases in 1995 and 2002 respectively, and lower in eight and five: see the first column of 
both tables). This evidence suggests that as a whole, the regional differences in characteristics 
represent a significant cause of the differences between regions in wage inequality.  
The hypothetical wages 2 have been obtained from the equation (A.7), establishing only 
the effect of the unobservable factors with that existing in Spain. The differences of these wages 
with respect to the hypothetical wages 1 are exclusively due, therefore, to the substitution of 
relative returns in Spain as a whole by the relative returns of each region. Consequently, the 
comparison of the dominance results obtained with both types of counterfactual wages reveals the 
effect that the regional differences have on the mechanisms for determining wages in the 
generation of wage inequalities between regions. In practice, the number of dominances is very 
similar in both cases. In 1995, a total of 115 (of which 35 are strong) for hypothetical wages 1 and 
106 (32 strong) for hypothetical wages 2; and in 2002 a total of 108 (7 strong) as opposed to 107 
(17 strong). However, for a highly significant number of regional comparisons the results change; 
64 in 1995 and 74 in 2002 (consequently it remains at 72 and 62). Moreover, in the specific case of 
comparisons with Spain as a whole, the direction of dominance changes for eight regions. This 
circumstance can be observed in the Hesse diagrams for both types of counterfactual wage9. These 
different types of wage reveal pronounced differences, which are logically translated into 
significant differences between the rank position indicators of the regions, especially in 2002 (table 
4)10. 
In order to further analyse the effect that the regional differences have on relative returns 
in generating wage inequalities between regions, table 5 contains for each of the years analysed the 
results derived from applying the stochastic dominance techniques to the Lorenz dominance 
analysis in the bilateral comparisons for each region between the wage distributions corresponding 
to the hypothetical wages 1 and 2. The differences between the two distributions are caused 
exclusively by the differences existing between the region and Spain as a whole in terms of the 
effect of relative returns, whereby a positive (negative) dominance of the first over the second 
                                                 
9 For reasons of space, these diagrams have not been included in the study. They are available from the authors on 
request.  
10 Therefore, in both years there is a positive correlation, 0.52 and 0.22, respectively, but the values are far from the 
unit value of 1 (and statistically significant only in the first case, at 5%).  
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indicates that the relative returns of Spain generate a lower (higher) degree of inequality than those 
of the region. In 1995, a total of 10 negative dominances, 2 positive dominances and 5 
comparisons in which there is no dominance were recorded, while in 2002 these results are 9, 4 
and 4 respectively. These findings suggest that in the majority of the Spanish regions the relative 
returns are different from the national average, to the point of generating a different degree of 
wage inequality. A particularly interesting finding is that in Madrid positive dominances are 
recorded in both years, which indicates its high relative weight in Spain. The results as a whole 
reveal, in any event, that the regional differences in relative returns play a relevant role in 
generating wage inequalities between regions, which is consistent with the presence of significant 
differences in the regional mechanisms for determining wages.   
The second question which the study examines is the extent to which all the Spanish 
regions share a declining trend in wage inequality which has been experienced in recent years in 
Spain as a whole. In this respect, table 6 includes the results derived from applying the stochastic 
dominance comparisons to the bilateral comparisons of the wage distributions of 1995 and 2002 
both for Spain and for each of the regions (the first column presents the result of the comparison 
of all of the distributions and the second presents the detailed results of the comparisons in each 
decile). It can therefore be confirmed that the decreasing pattern of inequality is practically 
generalised, as there is no region which has experienced an increase in inequality, while only three 
regions (Andalusia, Galicia and Madrid) do not exhibit a clear inequality trend (furthermore, in the 
first two regions this result is determined exclusively by the highest part of the wage distributions – 
and more specifically in the ninth decile -, with the rest ot their respective distributions 
experiencing a reduction in inequality). On the other hand, in the other Spanish regions, a lower 
inequality is observed: more specifically, in 10 regions a stronger dominance of the distribution is 
observed in 2002 with respect to 1995, while in another four (Navarra, Valencia Castilla-Leon and 
Aragon) a weak dominance can be observed.  
For the whole of Spain, a weak dominance may be observed in the wage distribution 
corresponding to 2002 over 1995. This result is interesting insofar as the results of the 
comparisons based on inference-based techniques of stochastic dominance confirm the findings 
of other research studies that indicate that Spain is experiencing a significant reduction in wage 
inequality. However, this result also reveals that this reduction is not statistically significant in 
certain segments of the distribution. In order to analyse this point in more depth, table 7 contains 
the detailed results of the dominance comparisons applied to each decile of the distributions of 
1995 and 2002. Since the contrast statistic in one decile is also a measurement of the distance 
existing between the coordinates of the two curves at this point, the specific size of this statistic 
can be used in this context as an indicator to determine which deciles have experienced a relatively 
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more pronounced reduction in inequality. In practice, it may be observed that the contrast 
statistics have very high values in the first deciles which reduce considerably in the central parts, 
particularly above the distribution. They begin by being systematically significant at 1% in the first 
deciles, then only being so at 10% in the eighth decile, while in the ninth decile they do not show 
conventional levels of significance. This evidence suggests that the reduction in inequality 
experienced in Spain during the period of analysis is more intense in the lower half of the wage 
distribution, and that it has no effect on the highest part. 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to examine wage inequality and its changes in Spain from a 
regional perspective, with the aim of improving the knowledge of this phenomenon and its 
determinants. In addition to being one of the few studies for Spain that introduces the regional 
dimension in the analysis of wage inequality, another of its notable aspects is the use of inference-
based techniques of Lorenz stochastic dominance, a methodology that enables us to construct an 
ordering of wage distributions in accordance with their inequality, of which there are hardly any 
previously published national or international studies applied to the analysis of wage inequality.    
The field of study is of particular interest because Spain is one of the few developed 
countries in which the majority of collective bargaining is developed through industry-wide 
agreements on an infra-national scale applied exclusively to provinces or regions. This infrequent 
regional dimension of collective bargaining on an industry level implies the presence in Spain of 
wage determination mechanisms that are differentiated by region, which give rise to the existence 
of differences in wage structures between regions. However, while this circumstance has been 
analysed in the case of regional differences of average wages, studies related to the analysis of wage 
inequality are scarce. 
The results obtained in the empirical analysis reveal that there are significant and persistent 
differences between the levels of wage inequality of the Spanish regions and that these differences 
tend to become more pronounced over time. The detailed analysis of the cause of these 
differences reveals that the regional differences existing in the composition of the workforce and 
the companies constitute a primary determinant of the regional differences in wage inequality. 
However, it may also be observed that in the majority of Spanish regions there are relative returns 
that differ from the national average and that the regional differences in returns generally play a 
relevant role in generating wage inequalities between regions. This evidence confirms the presence 
of significant regional differences in the mechanisms of wage determination. 
Lastly, from a time perspective, the most interesting finding is that the majority of Spanish 
regions share the declining trend in wage inequality which has been experienced in recent years in 
Spain as a whole. This implies the general nature of this phenomenon for the whole of the Spanish 
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labour market, contrasting with the overall trend of developed countries, which are experiencing 
an increase in wage dispersion caused by factors such as technological change or globalisation.  
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Figure 1 
Hesse diagram of Lorenz dominance. 1995. 
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Figure 2 
Hesse diagram of Lorenz dominance. 2002. 
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Table 1 
Average wages and wage inequality in Spanish regions. 
  1995   2002  
 Average 
wage 
(euros) 
Gini 
index 
Theil 
index 
Average 
wage 
(euros) 
Gini 
index 
Theil 
index 
Spain 8,25 0,317 0,184 9,46 0,297 0,167 
Andalucía 8,32 0,305 0,161 9,53 0,304 0,175 
Aragón 7,91 0,291 0,153 9,61 0,269 0,135 
Asturias 7,79 0,284 0,142 8,46 0,248 0,113 
Baleares 7,50 0,310 0,211 8,74 0,267 0,150 
Canarias 7,26 0,339 0,222 8,34 0,291 0,167 
Cantabria 7,09 0,278 0,140 7,58 0,208 0,086 
Castilla-La Mancha 6,91 0,295 0,164 7,98 0,264 0,135 
Castilla y León 7,92 0,298 0,154 8,93 0,282 0,144 
Cataluña 9,27 0,315 0,178 10,68 0,300 0,164 
Comunidad Valenciana 7,51 0,288 0,154 8,91 0,270 0,140 
Extremadura 6,32 0,314 0,182 6,64 0,224 0,102 
Galicia 7,06 0,313 0,186 8,59 0,308 0,195 
Madrid 10,34 0,355 0,231 11,11 0,350 0,230 
Murcia 6,25 0,283 0,150 7,53 0,245 0,126 
Navarra 8,01 0,251 0,115 9,76 0,226 0,094 
País Vasco 9,62 0,273 0,133 11,20 0,249 0,110 
La Rioja 6,54 0,249 0,126 7,96 0,215 0,095 
Coefficient of variation 0,154 0,092 0,201 0,150 0,142 0,280 
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Table 2 
Contrasts of Lorenz dominance. 1995. 
 Spain And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. C-LM C-L Cat. C.Val. Ext. Gal. Mad. Mur. Nav. P.V. 
Andalucía +***                 
Aragón +*** +                
Asturias +*** + =               
Baleares + x x x              
Canarias x x - - -             
Cantabria +*** + x x + +            
Castilla-La Mancha +*** + x x + +*** +           
Castilla y León +*** + - - x + - x          
Cataluña + - -*** -*** - x - - -***         
Comunidad Valenciana +*** + x x + +*** + = + +***        
Extremadura + x x x = + - - X + -       
Galicia + x x x - + - - X x - -      
Madrid -*** -*** -*** -*** - - -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** - -**     
Murcia + x - - x + x - X + - x x +***    
Navarra +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***   
País Vasco +*** + + = x + x x + +*** x x x +*** + -***  
La Rioja +*** + + + +*** +*** + + + +*** + +*** +*** +*** + x + 
Notes: A positive (negative) sign in a cell implies that the wage distribution in the region of the row Lorenz dominates (is Lorenz dominated) to the region of the spine. ***, ** 
and * indicate that the dominance is statistically significant in all deciles at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The symbol x indicates that there are cuts between Lorenz 
curves of wage distributions, so there is no dominance of any sign. 
 
 
Table 3 
Contrasts of Lorenz dominance. 2002. 
 Spain And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. C-LM C-L Cat. C.Val. Ext. Gal. Mad. Mur. Nav. P.V. 
Andalucía +*                 
Aragón + x                
Asturias +*** + +***               
Baleares +** = + -              
Canarias + = x - =             
Cantabria +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +***            
Castilla-La Mancha +*** +*** + x + +** -**           
Castilla y León +*** x + - - - -*** -          
Cataluña x - -** -*** - - -*** -*** -***         
Comunidad Valenciana +*** + + - = = -*** - + +        
Extremadura +*** +*** +** + +*** +*** - +** +*** +*** +***       
Galicia x - x - - - -*** -*** - x - -***      
Madrid -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -     
Murcia +*** + + - = + -*** - + +** x -** + +***    
Navarra +*** +*** +*** + +*** +*** - + +*** +*** +*** - +*** +*** +*   
País Vasco +*** x + - x x - x + +*** x - x + x -  
La Rioja +*** +*** +** + +*** +*** = + +*** +*** +*** = +*** +*** +** + + 
Notes: See notes of table 2. 
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 Table 4 
Position indicators of regions in Hesse diagrams. 
 1995 2002 
 
Actual 
wages 
Hypothetical 
wages 1 
Hypothetical 
wages 2 
Actual 
wages 
Hypothetical 
wages 1 
Hypothetical 
wages 2 
Andalucía -6   0  10  -3  11  15 
Aragón   4  -2   2  -9 -10   3 
Asturias   5  10   0   8  -2   4 
Baleares   0 -12   3   0  -1   8 
Comunidad Valenciana   9  -6   6   1   8   9 
Canarias -12   2   0  -1   8  -7 
Cantabria   5 -13 -14  16  -8  -4 
Castilla-La Mancha  -3   6   2  -6   0  -4 
Castilla y León   9 -14   2   7 -12   6 
Cataluña -11  12  11 -13  14   5 
España -14  -1  -5 -13   5  -5 
Extremadura  -1  -7 -14  14  -8 -15 
Galicia  -5  14  -3 -11  15  -1 
La Rioja  16  -9 -11  15 -16  -3 
Madrid -17  15  -4 -17   5 -15 
Murcia  -3 -15 -17   2  11 -15 
Navarra  16  11  16  11  10  15 
País Vasco   6   9  16   0  12  15 
Notes: The position indicator measures the number of dominances exerted in bilateral comparisons by other regions on the 
reference region minus the number of dominances of the region above the rest. Hypothetical wages 1 and 2 correspond to 
those generated for each of the regions from equations (A.6) and (A.7), respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 
Constrast of Lorenz dominance.  
Comparison of regional counterfactual wage distributions. 
 1995 2002 
Andalucía - - 
Aragón - - 
Asturias = - 
Baleares - + 
Canarias - = 
Cantabria - x 
Castilla-La Mancha - - 
Castilla-León = - 
Cataluña - + 
Comunidad Valenciana = - 
Extremadura = = 
Galicia +*** + 
Madrid + +** 
Murcia = = 
Navarra - - 
País Vasco - - 
La Rioja - - 
Notes: A positive sign (negative) in a cell implies that the distribution of hypothetical 
wages 2 in the region Lorenz dominates (is Lorenz dominated) by the distribution of 
hypothetical wages 1. ***, ** and * indicate that the dominance is statistically significant 
in all deciles at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The symbol x indicates that 
there are cuts between Lorenz curves of wage distributions, so there is no dominance 
of any sign. Hypothetical wages 1 and 2 correspond to those generated for each of the 
regions from equations (A.6) and (A.7), respectively. 
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 Table 6 
Longitudinal comparisons of inequality between 1995 and 2002. 
Results of contrasts of Lorenz dominance and contrasts by deciles. 
 
Lorenz 
dominance 
Deciles with 
significant 
differences  
Spain + 1-8 (+) 
Andalucía x 1-7 (+) 9(-) 
Aragón + 1-4 (+) 
Asturias +*** 1-9 (+) 
Baleares +*** 1-9 (+) 
Canarias +*** 1-9 (+) 
Cantabria +*** 1-9 (+) 
Castilla-La Mancha +*** 1-9 (+) 
Castilla-León + 1-7 (+) 
Cataluña +*** 1-9 (+) 
Comunidad Valenciana + 1-8 (+) 
Extremadura +*** 1-9 (+) 
Galicia x 1-7 (+) 9 (-) 
Madrid x 1-3 (+) 6-7 (-) 
Murcia +*** 1-9 (+) 
Navarra + 1-4 (+) 
País Vasco +*** 1-9 (+) 
La Rioja +*** 1-9 (+) 
Notes: The first column shows the results of the contrasts of Lorenz dominance 
comparisons for the set of Lorenz curves. A positive (negative) sign in a box in that 
column indicates that in the territory of reference the 2002 wage distribution Lorenz 
dominates (is Lorenz dominated). ***, ** and * indicate that the dominance is statistically 
significant in all deciles at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The symbol x indicates 
that there are cuts between Lorenz curves of wage distributions, so there is no dominance 
of any sign. The second column contains the detailed results of the comparisons of 
Lorenz curves in each decile of the distributions (specifically, the deciles for which 
statistical tests reveal differences in the curves with a significance of at least 10%). 
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 Table 7 
Detailed results of contrasts by deciles of the comparison of 1995 and 2002  
wage distributions in Spain. 
Coordinates of Lorenz curve Contrast 
statistic Decile 
1995 2002  
1 0,0382 
(0,0001) 
0,0432 
(0,0001) 
-31,43*** 
2 
0,0873 
(0,0002) 
0,0973 
(0,0002) 
-33,47*** 
3 
0,1433 
(0,0003) 
0,1577 
(0,0004) 
-31,63*** 
4 
0,2068 
(0,0004) 
0,2241 
(0,0005) 
-27,78*** 
5 
0,2801 
(0,0005) 
0,2972 
(0,0006) 
-21,35*** 
6 
0,3657 
(0,0007) 
0,3789 
(0,0007) 
-13,42*** 
7 
0,4654 
(0,0008) 
0,4736 
(0,0009) 
-7,01*** 
8 
0,5833 
(0,0009) 
0,5876 
(0,0010) 
-3,13* 
9 
0,7312 
(0,0010) 
0,7341 
(0,0011) 
-1,94 
Notes: A positive sign (negative) of the statistic indicates that, in the decile 
considered, the ordinate of the Lorenz curve for 2002 is higher than in 1995. 
***, ** and * indicate that the dominance is statistically significant in all deciles 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Appendix 1 
A.1. Statistical inference applied to the study of Lorenz dominance 
Let us assume a wage distribution that is divided into K+1 quantiles. The K values of the 
x-axis of the Lorenz curve would be K21 p...pp <<< , with K wages ( piξ ) delimiting this axis and 
K coordinates of the Lorenz curve K21 L...LL <<< . The average conditional variance for wages 
less than or equal to piξ  will be respectively, ( )pii ξw/wEγ ≤≡  and ( )[ ]pi2i2i ξw/γwEλ ≤−≡ . 
Taking the expression of the conditional averages into account, the coordinates of the generalised 
Lorenz curve for wage distribution will be ( )´µ,γp,...,γp,γpG KK2211= . If all the wages are 
ordered from the lowest (w(1)) to the highest (w(N)), obtaining ( ) ( ) ( )N21 w...ww ≤≤≤ , ( )Jw  the jth 
observation will have a weight jω . If piξˆ is the rth order statistic, so that piξˆ = ( )irw , the piξˆ  
statistics will be asymptotically distributed as a multivariate normal distribution. 
Based on this approach, Beach and Davidson (1983) derive the variance and covariance 
matrix of the generalised Lorenz curve coordinates, and prove that the vector of generalised 
Lorenz coordinates ( )'µ,...,Gˆ,GˆGˆ 21=  is asymptotically normal, as )GGˆ(n −  has a K variate 
normal distribution limit with an average of zero and variance and covariance matrix Π . Taking 
into account that the coordinates of the Lorenz curve can be written as a transformation of the 
generalised curve, µ/GLˆ ii
)
= , where µ is the average of the variable analysed, based on Π  the 
variance and covariance matrix of the Lorenz curve coordinates can be extracted, with the 
distribution of )LL(n −
)
 in this case also being multivariate normal. With respect to these 
distributions, Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1989) suggest the use of statistical contrasts to compare 
coordinate pairs of the Lorenz curve in which the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
B
i
A
ii,0 LL:H =  and 
B
i
A
ii,a LL:H ≠   ∀ i = 1, 2, …, K     (A.1)  
where AiL and 
B
iL are the Lorenz curve coordinates for each i of the wage vectors of A and B 
respectively. The statistical contrast for the ith element of the vectors AL  and BL would be: 
  
2/1
B
B
ii
A
A
ii
B
i
A
i
Li
n
vˆ
n
vˆ
LˆLˆ
T












+





−
=     for  i = 1, 2,…, K                     (A.2)  
where vˆ  is the estimator of the elements of the variance and covariance matrix associated with the 
distribution of the Lorenz curve coordinates. Under the null hypothesis LiT  it is asymptotically 
normal. The critical values for the contrast are obtained through the distribution of the 
25
 studentized maximum modulus (Stoline and Ury, 1979) which contemplates the correlation 
between the coordinates which are compared. 
 On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis may be contemplated as a double hypothesis:  
B
i
A
ii,a LL:H >
+  and Bi
A
ii,a LL:H <
−          (A.3) 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, there are three possible results for the wage inequality 
comparisons between regions A and B. There is weak dominance in the wage distribution of A 
(and consequently less wage inequality in this region than in B) if for some quantiles Bi
A
i LL >  and 
for others Bi
A
i LL =  (for practical purposes, it is important to point out that the contrasts have 
been developed for the deciles of the distributions); there is strong dominance if for all i Bi
A
i LL > , 
and the Lorenz curves are cut and there is no dominance if for some quantiles Bi
A
i LL >  and for 
others Bi
B
i LL < . 
A.2. The Juhn et al. (1993) technique  
Taking the wage distribution for the whole of Spain as a reference for generating regional 
counterfactual distributions, the technique proposed by Juhn et al, (1993) is based on the separate 
estimate of the following equations of individual wages:    
Esp
i
EspEsp
i
Esp
i εβXw +=                   (A.4) 
kkkk reg
i
regreg
i
reg
i εβXw +=                              (A.5) 
Where the super-indices Esp and regk correspond to Spain and the region k, respectively; 
j
iw corresponds to the gross hourly wage of the individual i in territory j (j=Spain, region k); 
j
iX is 
a vector of observed characteristics (among which a constant term is included) of the individual  i; 
jβ is the vector of parameters estimated in the territory j; and jiε is an individual term of random 
error.  
Juhn et al. (1993) suggest the decomposition of the differences existing between the two 
distributions by the auxiliary use of counterfactual distributions calculated for scenarios in which 
the differences between distributions caused by the effect of unobservable factors and relative 
returns are eliminated. In particular, these authors propose a control of the effect of the 
unobservable factors in the generation of differences between the two distributions based on the 
principle that the error term of an individual corresponds with his/her position in the residual 
distribution. So, if θi=F(εi|Xi) is the residual percentile of the worker i with observed 
characteristics Xi, by definition εi=F
-1(θi|Xi) can be expressed where F-1 is the inverse of the 
cumulative distribution function. This enables the individual i to be assigned a residue of a residual 
distribution different to his/her own based on the residue corresponding to the percentile θi. In 
26
 this way, if the residual distribution for Spain as a whole is taken as a reference, Esp,1F − , and the 
wage structure estimated for Spain is also taken as a reference, Espβˆ , the hypothetical wage that the 
individual i would have in region k if it were determined by relative returns and the unobservable 
factors of Spain as a whole and by its own individual characteristics (which we will call 
hypothetical wage 1) would be:  
)X|θ(FβˆX1whip kkk regii
Esp,1Espreg
i
reg
i
−+=                (A.6) 
All of the hypothetical wages generated by this method for the individuals in region k 
constitute the counterfactual wage distribution of that region under the assumption that the 
relative returns and unobservable factors of the region are the same as those of Spain as a whole. 
The counterfactual distribution variations for region k derived from the equation (A.6) with 
respect to the wage distribution that is actually observed for Spain, derived from the equation 
(A.4), are solely due to the differences existing between region k and Spain in the observed 
characteristics of individuals and companies. Furthermore, the comparison for different regions of 
the counterfactual distributions generated with the equation (A.6) allows us to observe the extent 
to which their differences in wage inequality are due to different endowments of characteristics.  
The technique proposed by Juhn et al. (1993) enables an alternative counterfactual 
distribution to be generated for each region under the hypothesis that the wage of the individuals 
in region k is determined by the unobservable factors of Spain as a whole, the relative returns of 
the region and their own individual characteristics (which we will call hypothetical wage 2): 
)X|θ(FβˆX2whip kkkk
reg
ii
Esp,1regreg
i
reg
i
−+=                    (A.7) 
The counterfactual wage distribution shaped by the wages generated in this way for all of 
the workers of region k differs from the counterfactual wage distribution derived from equation 
(A.6) exclusively in terms of the differences existing between the relative returns of the region and 
those of Spain. The differences existing in the comparison of the respective regional 
counterfactual distributions generated with equations (A.6) and (A.7) for the different regions 
enable us to observe, therefore, the extent to which the differences in wage inequality are due to 
regions differences in returns.   
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 Appendix 2 
 
Table A.1 
Contrasts of Lorenz dominance. Hypothetical wages 1. 1995. 
 Spain And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. C-LM C-L Cat. C.Val. Ext. Gal. Mad. Mur. Nav. P.V. 
Andalucía =                 
Aragón x -                
Asturias + + +               
Baleares - - - -              
Canarias + + x - +             
Cantabria - - - -* = -            
Castilla-La 
Mancha -*** -*** - -*** - - =           
Castilla y 
León + + + = + + + +***          
Cataluña + + + x + + + +*** +         
Comunidad 
Valenciana - - x -** + - + + -*** 
-
***        
Extremadura - - - - + - + + - -* =       
Galicia + + + x + + + +** + + + +**      
Madrid +*** + + + +* + +* +*** + x +*** + x     
Murcia -*** - - -*** - - = = -*** - - - -*** -***    
Navarra + + + = +* + + +*** + x +** + x - +***   
País Vasco + + + = +*** + + +*** + - +*** + - - +*** =  
La Rioja - - - - + - = = - -** = = -** -* + -*** -*** 
Notes: See notes of table 2. 
 
 
Table A.2 
Contrasts of Lorenz dominance. Hypothetical wages 2. 1995. 
 Spain And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. C-LM C-L Cat. C.Val. Ext. Gal. Mad. Mur. Nav. P.V. 
Andalucía +***                 
Aragón + -                
Asturias + - =               
Baleares x x x x              
Canarias x - x x =             
Cantabria - -*** -** -** - -            
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
+ - x x = = +           
Castilla y 
León 
+ - x + x x +** x          
Cataluña +* = + + x + +** + +         
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
+ - x + x + + = + -        
Extremadura - -*** - - -* -* = -*** - -*** -***       
Galicia x x x x - - + - X - - +      
Madrid x - - - x x + x - - - + x     
Murcia -*** -*** -*** -*** -** -*** - -*** -*** -*** -*** - - -***    
Navarra +* + + + + + +*** + + + +** +*** + + +***   
País Vasco +*** + + + + + +*** + +* + + +*** + +*** +*** =  
La Rioja - - - - - - + - - - - + - - + -*** -*** 
Notes: See notes of table 2. 
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 Table A.3 
Contrasts of Lorenz dominance. Hypothetical wages 1. 2002. 
 Spain And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. C-LM C-L Cat. C.Val. Ext. Gal. Mad. Mur. Nav. P.V. 
Andalucía +                 
Aragón - -                
Asturias - - +               
Baleares - - + =              
Canarias = = + + +             
Cantabria - - x = - -            
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
-** -** - - - - -           
Castilla y 
León 
- - + + = - + +          
Cataluña +** x + + + + + +*** +         
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
+ - + x + = + + + -        
Extremadura - - + = - - = = - - -       
Galicia + + + + + + + + + x + +      
Madrid x x + x + - + + + - - + -     
Murcia - -** x - - - - = - -* - = - -    
Navarra - - = - - - = = - - - = - - =   
País Vasco + x + + + + + +*** + x x + x x + +  
La Rioja - - - - - - = - - - - - - - - - - 
Notes: See notes of table 2. 
 
Table A.4 
Contrasts of Lorenz dominance. Hypothetical wages 2. 2002. 
 Spain And. Arag. Ast. Bal. Can. Cant. C-LM C-L Cat. C.Val. Ext. Gal. Mad. Mur. Nav. P.V. 
Andalucía +                 
Aragón + -                
Asturias + - =               
Baleares + - + =              
Canarias = -** - - -             
Cantabria x - - - - x            
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
= - - - - = -           
Castilla y 
León 
= - - - - + x =          
Cataluña +*** - = = - + + + +         
Comunidad 
Valenciana 
+ - + + = + + + + x        
Extremadura - - - - - - - - - - -       
Galicia x -*** x x - + x x X x - +      
Madrid - -* -* -* - - - - - -*** - x -     
Murcia - -* - - - - - - - - - = - x    
Navarra +* x + + + + + +* + + + +** + +** +**   
País Vasco +*** x + + + +* + +*** +* + + +*** + +*** +*** =  
La Rioja = - = = = = = = = - - + - + + - - 
Notes: See notes of table 2. 
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